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Social	Networking	Technologies
Game	Theory	and	Social	
Networks
The	narrative
• Modelling	how	individuals	
respond	to	each	others’ actions
• Predicting	behaviour	when		
individuals	interact
• Predicting	behaviour	spread	and	
evolution	in	a	group	(next	session)
• Predicting	behaviour	spread	in	a	
network	(next	session)
The	narrative
Modelling	how	individuals	respond	
to	each	others’ actions
What	is	a	Game
• Individuals	can	act	according	to	their	
self-interest	when	presented	with	
choices
• But	when	more	than	one	individuals	
interact	with	each	other	their	choices
can	lead	to	different	outcomes
• Acting	according	to	self	interest	does	
not	always	yield	the	maximum	profit	
in	such	cases
• How	can	we	reason	about	
behaviour?
• How	can	we	predict	outcomes?
Presentation	or	Exam?
• You	and	your	partner	need	to	work	
on	your	common	project	and	your	
exam	at	the	same	time
• You	need	to	make	a	choice	between	
the	two
• Your	grades	will	be	determined	
based	on	how	well	you	do	on	both
SOURCE: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book
What	is	a	Game
• A	game	is	the	environment	where	
such	interactions	take	place	and	it	
consists	of:
– A	set	of	participants:	players
– Options	per	participant:	strategies
– Benefit	per	choice	of	option:	payoff
• Payoffs	can	be	based	on	the	choices	
not	of	one	participant	but	of	all	
participants
• They	are	shown	in	a	payoff	matrix
Prisoner’s	Dilemma
• Two	have	been	taken	prisoners	and	are	
questioned	by	the	police
• They	are	both	guilty
• When	questioned	they	are	offered	the	option	to	
confess
– Should	both	of	them	confess	they	will	be	convicted	to	
serve	in	prison	for	5	years
– Should	just	one	of	them	confess,	the	confessor	will	be	
let	free,	while	the	other	one	will	serve	10	years
– Should	none	of	them	confess,	they	will	both	serve	a	
year	for	resisting	arrest.
• Prisoners	cannot	communicate	with	each	other
Prisoner’s	Dilemma
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Prisoner’s	Dilemma
Confess	Strategy Not	Confess	Strategy
Co
nf
es
s	S
tra
te
gy
P1(S,	T),	P2(S,	T) P1(S’,	T),	P2(S’,	T)
No
tC
on
fe
ss
St
ra
te
gy
P1(S,	T’),	P2(S,	T’) P1(S’,	T’),	P2(S’,	T’)
Best	responses
• Let’s	assume	we	have	a	player	1	and	a	
player	2	with	strategies	S	and	T	
respectively.
– P1(S,	T)	and	P2(S,	T)	are	the	payoffs	for	each	
player	given	their	strategies.
• For	a	player,	a	best	response	is	the	best	
choice	they	can	make	given	a	certain	
expectation	of	a	choice	from	the	other	
player
• Given	a	choice	of	a	strategy	T	by	player	2,	
a	best	response	for	player	1	is	strategy	S,	
when	for	every	other	available	strategy	S’
– P1(S,	T)	≥ P1(S’,	T)	
Strictly	best	responses
• Given	a	choice	of	a	strategy	T	by	
player	2,	a	strict	best	response	for	
player	1	is	strategy	S,	when	for	
every	other	available	strategy	S’
– P1(S,	T)	> P1(S’,	T)	
Dominant	Strategies
• A	dominant	strategy	S	for	Player	1	is	one	
that	is	the	best	response	to	every	
strategy	of	Player	2.
• A	strictly	dominant	strategy	S	for	Player	
1	is	one	that	is	the	strictly	best	response	
to	every	strategy	of	Player	2
• There	is	the	assumption	that	players	
have	come	common	knowledge	of	
possible	payoffs	of	each	other,	etc
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The	narrative
Predicting	behaviour	when		
individuals	interact
Predicting	outcomes
• In	games	with	strictly	dominant	
strategies,	we	expect	players	to	
chose	those	strategies
– This	basic	assumption	has	been	
debated	but	it	is	a	basic	one	in	game	
theory
• In	games	without	strictly	dominant	
strategies,	how	can	we	predict	the	
choices	of	the	players?	– SEE	
EQUILIBRIA
Example	- equilibria
• Firm	1	and	Firm	2	are	competing	for	clients	A,	B	and	C
• Firm	1	too	small,	Firm	2	is	large
• They	need	to	decide	which	client	to	approach
– If	they	approach	the	same	client	they	get	half	the	client’s	business	each
– If	Firm	1	approaches	a	client	on	its	own	they	will	get	0	business
– If	Firm	2	approaches	B	or	C	on	its	own,	they	will	get	their	full	business
– A	is	a	large	client	and	will	do	business	only	with	both	of	them	and	they	payoff	
will	be	higher	(4	each)
– Business	with	B	or	C	is	worth	2
SOURCE: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book
Example	- equilibria
SOURCE: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book
• (A,	A)	is	the	only	Nash	Equilibrium
Nash	Equilibrium
• In	a	game	where	player	1	choses	strategy	S	and	player	
2	choses	strategy	T,	the	pair	of	strategies	(S,	T)	is	a	
Nash	Equilibrium if
– S	is	a	best	response	to	T,	and
– T	is	a	best	response	to	S.
• The	expectation	is	that	even	when	there	are	no	
dominant	strategies,	if	there	are	Nash	equilibria,	
players	will	chose	the	strategies	of	the	equilibria
• This	is	based	on	the	belief	that	each	party	will	make	
this	choice
• But	how	can	we	predict	behaviour	when	there	are	
more	than	one	Nash	Equilibria	in	a	game?
– And	they	yield	the	same	payoffs?
Is there a Nash equilibrium in the prisoner’s dilemma game?
Multiple	Equilibria
• A	Coordination	Game
– What	can	you	and	your	partner	choose	when	
preparing	a	common	presentation?	Keynote	or	
PowerPoint?
• We	assume	that	you	cannot	convert	from	one	to	the	other
SOURCE: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book
Two Nash 
Equilibria:
(P, P) (K, K)
Multiple	Equilibria:	Focal	Points
• To	predict	which	of	the	multiple	
equilibria	players	will	chose	one	can	
argue	that	there	can	be	“natural	
reasons” not	shown	in	the	payoff	matrix	
that	will	create	a	bias	for	one	equilibrium
– This	will	be	a	focal	point
– E.g.	if	PowerPoint	is	more	frequently	used	
in	the	University	maybe	both	players	will	
chose	this	instead	of	Keynote
• Reference:	Schelling,	T.	(1960)	A	Strategy	of	Conflict.	
Harvard	University	Press
Multiple	Equilibria
• Anti-coordination	games:
– Hawk-Dove	Game
– Chicken
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Do
ve
	St
ra
te
gy
3,	3 1,	5
Ha
w
k	
St
ra
te
gy
5,	1 0, 0
Matching	Pennies
• What	about	games	with	no	Nash	Equilibria?
• Two	players	hold	a	penny	each	and	they	decide	which	side	to	
show	to	each	other	each	time
• Player	1	looses	her/his	penny	if	they	match
• Player	2	looses	his/her	penny	if	they	don’t	match
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Mixed	Strategies
• When	there	are	no	equilibria	(as	
in	the	matching	pennies	game)	we	
can	assign	a	probability	on	each	
strategy
– E.g.	Player	1	will	choose	Head	with	a	
probability	p
• and	Tail	with	with	probability	1-p
• Player	1	is	choosing	a	pure	strategy	
Head	if	p=1
Mixed	Strategies	and	Equilibria
• An	equilibrium	with	mixed	strategies	
is	one	where	probabilities	of	
strategies	for	Player	1	is	the	best	
response	to	a	probability	of	
strategies	by	Player	2
• In	the	matching	pennies	game,	we	
have	an	equilibrium	for	probability	½	
for	each	strategy	for	each	player
– In	cases	where	payoffs	are	less	
‘symmetric’ equilibria	are	based	on	
unequal	probabilities
Strategy	Optimisation
• Pure	strategies	vs.	Mixed	strategies
– Mixed	strategies	can	help	find	
additional	Nash	equilibria	or	the	only	
Nash	equilibria
• Individual	optimisation	vs.	group	
optimisation
– Dominant	strategies,	Nash	equilibria,	
focal	points	refer	to	individual	
optimisation
– Pareto	optimality	and	social	optimality	
refer	to	group	optimisation	
Pareto	Optimality
• Take	a	choice	of	strategies;	it	is	
Pareto-optimal	if	there	is	no	other	
choice	in	which	all	players	receive	
payoffs	that
– are	at	least	as	high,	and
– At	least	one	player	receives	a	strictly	
higher	payoff
• It	could	be	that	a	unique	nash
equilibrium	is	not	pareto-optimal;	a	
binding	agreement	is	required	to	
ensure	that	a	pareto-optimal	set	of	
strategies	is	chosen	in	that	case
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Social	Optimality
• A	choice	of	strategies	by	the	players	
that	maximizes	the	sum	of	the	
players’ payoffs
• If	a	pair	of	strategies	is	socially	
optimal	is	also	Pareto-optimal
– Discuss:	why?
• Of,	course,	adding	payoffs	to	
establish	social	welfare	has	to	be	
meaningful
Which pair of 
strategies here is 
socially-optimal?
SOURCE: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book
Pareto	Optimality
• Take	a	choice	of	strategies;	it	is	
Pareto-optimal	if	there	is	no	other	
choice	in	which	all	players	receive	
payoffs	that
– are	at	least	as	high,	and
– At	least	one	player	receives	a	strictly	
higher	payoff
• It	could	be	that	a	unique	nash
equilibrium	is	not	pareto-optimal;	a	
binding	agreement	is	required	to	
ensure	that	a	pareto-optimal	set	of	
strategies	is	chosen	in	that	case
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Which pairs of strategies are socially-optimal?
Multiplayer	Games
• They	can	be	used	to	model	games	with	
more	than	one	players
• Nash	equilibrium	in	a	multiplayer	game	
with	players	1,	…,	n
– A	set	of	strategies	(S1,	S2,	…,	Sn)	in	which	each	
strategy	is	the	best	response	to	all	the	others
– For	player	i,	strategy	Si is	a	best	response	if	for	
any	other	available	strategy	S’i
Pi(S1,	…,	Si,	Si+1,	…,	Sn)	≥	Pi(S1,	…,	S’i,	Si+1,	…,	Sn)
Game	Theory	&	Social	Networks
• How	do	people	decide	to	establish	
connections?
• Modelling	and	understanding	
privacy	and	trust	in	Social	Networks
Reference:	Buskens.	Social	networks	and	trust.		(2002)
• Given	a	network	structure	and	that	
interaction	can	happen	along	
established	edges	what	is	the	
behaviour	on	different	types	of	
networks?
• Discuss:	Other	problems?
Research	Case
• Hawks	and	Doves	in	small-world	
networks
• “The	role	of	network	clustering	on	
cooperation	in	the	Hawk-Dove	
game”
• Assuming	static	network	
structures
• “Dovelike	behaviour	is	advantaged	
if	synchronous	update	is	used”
SOURCE: Tomassini et al. Hawks and Doves on 
small-world networks. Physical Review E (2006) vol. 
73 (1) pp. 016132
able to propagate !having a gain exactly equal to that of their
neighboring doves". The system is thus found locked in a
configuration of a very high proportion of doves with a sig-
nificant number of isolated hawks.
If r!0, lone hawks always have a higher payoff than the
doves in their surroundings and will thus infect one of their
neighbors with its strategy. However for 0"r#0.1, once the
pair of hawks is established, their payoff is lower than the
one of any of the doves connected to either one them. Even
a dove that interacts with both hawks has an average payoff
still greater than what a hawk composing the pair receives.
Consequently, when 0"r#0.1, clusters of hawks first start
by either disappearing or reducing to single hawks, as previ-
ously explained for the r=0 case, but then these lone hawks
will become pairs of hawks. If the updates are done synchro-
nously, a pair of hawks will either vanish or reduce back to a
single hawk. One can clearly see that in the long run, hawks
will become extinct. Now if the update are done asynchro-
nously, a pair cannot totally disappear because only one
player is updated at a time. However, this mechanism of a
pair reducing to a single hawk and turning back into a pair
again will cause the small groups of two hawks to move
across the network and “collide” with each other, forming
larger groups that reduce back to a single-pair hawk forma-
tion. Therefore, after a large number of time steps, only a
very few hawks will survive.
If we take another look at Figs. 1 and 2, we note that
when the population of players is constrained to a latticelike
structure, the proportion of doves is reduced to zero for val-
ues of the gain-to-cost ratio greater than or equal to #0.8,
whereas this not the case when the topology is a random
graph. Let us try to give a qualitative explanation of the two
different behaviors. The first thing to be pointed out is that,
in the case of the replicators dynamics, if a dove is sur-
rounded by eight hawk neighbors, it is condemned to die for
values of r! 79 , whatever the topology may be. However, this
does not explain why for these same values, doves no longer
exist on square lattices or small worlds but are able to sur-
vive on random graphs. If the population were mixing, r
=0.8 would induce a proportion of doves equal to 20%.
Therefore, let us suppose that at a certain time step, there is
approximately 20% of doves in our population. Furthermore,
as pointed out by Hauert and Doebeli $6%, in the Hawk-Dove
game on lattices, the doves are usually spread out and form
many small isolated patches. Thus, we will also suppose
20% of doves in the population implies that in a set of play-
ers comprising an individual and its immediate eight neigh-
bors, there are about two doves. Hence, a D-player has on
average one dove and seven hawks in its neighborhood. In
the lattice network, this pair of doves can be linked in two
different manners !see Fig. 8", having either two or four
common neighbors, thus, an average of three.
More generally, if we denote $ the clustering coefficient
of the graph and k¯ the average degree, a pair of doves will
have on average $!k¯−1" common neighbors. Let us denote x
one of the two doves composing the pair as Hx, a hawk
linked to x but not to the other dove of the pair, and Hx,y, one
that is connected to both doves. If 23"r"
7
8 and, assuming
that the hawks surrounding the pair of doves are not inter-
acting with any other doves !this gives the pair of doves a
maximum chance of survival", we have
GHx" Gx" GHx,y ,
where G% is the average payoff of player %.
Consequently, according to Eq. !1", x can infect Hx, and
Hx,y can infect x.
Let us now calculate for what values of r the probability
that x invades the site of at least one Hx is less than an Hx,y
infecting x. To do so, let us distinguish the case of the asyn-
chronous updating policy from the synchronous one.
A. Asynchronous dynamics
The probability that an Hx neighbor is chosen to be up-
dated and adopts strategy D is given by
!2"
where N is the size of the population, !!" the probability an
Hx hawk is chosen to be updated !among the N players", !!!"
the probability the chosen Hx hawk compares its payoff with
player x, and finally & is the function defined in Eq. !1".
The probability that x is chosen to be updated and is in-
fected by one of the Hx,y hawks is given by
!3"
where !!" is the probability x is chosen to be updated, !!!"
the probability it measures itself against an Hx,y neighbor,
and & the function defined by Eq. !1".
For a square lattice with a Moore neighborhood !$= 37 and
k¯=8", expressions !2" and !3" give us r! 4659 &0.78, whereas
FIG. 8. !Color online" Lattice: two possible configurations.
TOMASSINI, LUTHI, AND GIACOBINI PHYSICAL REVIEW E 73, 016132 !2006"
016132-8
Predicting	behaviour	with	
Game	Theory
• Are	there	(strictly)	dominant	strategies?
• Or	any	Nash	equilibria?
• If	there	are	many	Nash	equilibria	can	we	
predict	which	one	will	be	achieved	based	
on	higher	payoffs	or	focal	points?
• Are	there	pareto-optimal	pairs	of	
strategies?
– Are	Nash	equilibria	among	them?	A	binding	
agreement	would	be	required	if	not.
• Is	there	a	socially-optimal	pair	of	
strategies?
Lessons	learned
• Understanding	of	the	main	concepts	of	Game	
Theory.	Given	a	payoff	matrix	be	able	to	identify	
and	explain	best	responses,	dominant	
strategies,	equilibria,	focal	points,	pareto	
optimality,	social	optimality.
• Ability	to	explain	how	Game	Theory	can	apply	
to	specific	problems	in	social	networks	and	
outline	how.
• Easley,	D.	and	Kleinberg,	J.	Networks	Crowds	and	Markets.	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010.	
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book (chapters	6	and	7)
